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The full effect of the adoption of the positional risk and operating
premises doctrines awaits further illumination by the Court of Appeals.
It is clear that the new look which the Court is giving KRS 842.005(1)
requirements of arising "out of and in the course of his employment"
will result in allowing more comprehensive coverage.
Glen S. Bagby
ARREST PRocEIDuE: BiGHT TO USE FORCE TO ARREST DURING A BRoT
A riot is the earlier sowing of bitterness and confusion by political op-
portunists and racial hate mongers, goody goody fakes, Negro and white,
coupling themselves tragically with the public apathy that marks off
this whole generation to anybody's needs.1
Kentucky's first racial violence occured in Louisville, beginning on
the evening of May 27, 1968.2 The rioting continued for several days
and was accompanied by vandalism, looting and burning. Several of
Louisville's ghetto residents were injured, many by policemen's
bullets. This tragedy reached its climax when two teenage Negro
boys were killed-one by a storeowner and the other by a blast from
I Sermon by the Rev. W. Carter Merbreier, Shattered Toys in Black and
White on the Philadelphia Riots, Summer, 1964 as cited by Leary, The Role of
the Police in Riotous Demonstrations, 40 NomRE DAME LAw 499, 501 (1965).21t started one evening when 350 young ghetto residents came to a rally
to see and listen to Stokely Carmichael. Circulars had been distributed to the
ghetto residents stating that Carmichael would be the featured speaker at a rally
called to demand the dismissal of a Louisville patrolman. Actually, the circulars
were a come-on to attract a crowd. Members of the Black Unity League of
Kentucky who organized the rally knew that Carmichael would not appear. At the
rally, a rumor was started by James Cortez, a self-proclaimed volunteer worker
for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, who climbed upon the top
of his car and said, "I am Stokely's right hand-man. Stokely wanted to be here,
but another honky [white man] trick is keeping Stokely out of Louisville." By
this time, twenty-five teenagers were perched atop buildings in the area to ob-
serve the rally. After several speeches, part of the crowd chanted, "Black power,
black power, black is beautiful." After more speeches which were drowned out
by shouts, it happened. A soft drink bottle was tossed from the top of a building.
Store windows were broken. Police cars rushed to the scene. Several of the cars
were struck with rocks and bottles as officers emerged from them with guns
drawn. "Man, when I saw those guns, it was all over," a fifteen year old said.
"That's when I started throwing." A few minutes later, a band of about twenty
youths went after an empty police captain's car. They rocked it back and forth
in almost joyous fashion until it finally turned over; later it was set afire. By now,
the atmosphere was festive, almost carnival-like. Two taxicabs were overturned
and set afire in the minutes that followed. "Oh baby, it's finally here. It's really
happening," several youths were heard to say as the rioting spread from the inter-




a policeman's shotgun.8 A Jefferson County coroner's jury found that
the Louisville patrolman killed the boy in the line of duty.4
Why did the rioting occur? Why were so many of the rioter's
tactics aimed at intimidating the police? The overt acts said to have
been the cause of the riot were rumors-rumors that Stokely Car-
michael had been barred from Louisville, and that a certain Louisville
patrolman who had been accused of brutality was back on the job
in the West End ghetto.; Perhaps the true cause of the riot was the
ingrained racial prejudice6 that pervades the United States and which
is most apparent in the dealings that Negroes have with the police.
1
3 James Groves, 14, was drawn from his home by the only excitement on his
block-a small gathering of young boys near a grocery store. Police said that a
patrolman shot him as he and two other youths fled the grocery store, dropping
loot as they ran. They said the patrolman fired a warning shot, reloaded, then
leveled the single shot 12 guage shotgun at the suspect disappearing into the
dark and fired.
Whether the boy was a looter or a mere onlooker will never be known. Five
persons claim the boy was merely watching the other boys; but two others claim
he was carrying away two bags of potato chips and two six-packs of Coca-Cola.
The Courier-Journal & Times, June 16, 1968, § A, at 10, cols. 2,8,4,5, 6.
4 The Courier-Journal, July 25, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 1. The attorney for the
policeman attempted to establish that the patrolman used his sawed-off 12 gauge
shotgun to stop a person caught in the act of storehouse breaking, a felony.
The Courier-Journal, July 25, 1968, § A, at 16, col. 2.
5 The Courier-Journal & Times, June 16, 1968, § A, at 11, col. 5.
6 The continued exclusion of Negroes from American economic and social life
is the fundamental cause of riots. This exclusion is a result of arbitrary racial bar-
riers rather than of lack of ability, motivation or aspiration on the part of Negroes,
and it is most galling to young Negroes who perceive it as arbitrary and unjust.
Caplan & Page, A Study of Ghetto Rioters, 219 ScimNxc Am. 15, 21 (1968).
7 The role of the police is questioned by every section of our nation. This
may be attributed to the impact of four historic trends: the increasing urbaniza-
tion of our country; the increasing insistence of the United States Supreme Court
on strict compliance by the police with the principles of the Bill of ights; the
vast and continuing migration of millions of Negro citizens, principally from
southern rural areas to the great metropolitan centers; and the civil rights
revolution of the sixties which is seeking to establish within this decade full free-
dom and equality for all Negro citizens. C. SILBERmAN, CPsis IN BLACK AN
WHrrE 357 (1964). See also 5 Comm'N ON Crvm RIGErs, REP. 24 (1961).
Police brutality is the most serious type of police abuse. This abuse occurs most
frequently during the arrest stage, if and when it occurs at all. In the tense
moment of initial contact between a policeman and a person he suspects of a
crime, some officers respond to force with a force that is out of proportion to the
need.
The prejudices existing between the police and the Negro have a long and
a violent history. Racial violence against Negroes in the South is lawlessness with
a history and a purpose. First with explicit and then with implicit legal sanction,
violence has been used since the early days of slavery to maintain and reinforce
the traditional subservient position of the Negro. U.S. COMeN ON CIVIL Ricr-rs,
LAw ENFoRcEN=: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION n TIE SOUT, (1965).
The police of the South generally come from the lower middle class in which
racial attitudes are firmly fixed because of their low level of education and socio-
economic insecurity. They see it as their job to keep the status quo and protect
"white womanhood" and "white supremacy." C. JOHNsON, PATTEmS OF NEGRO
SEGRECATON 26-29 (1943).
The Negro citizen sees the police officer in blue coat, with a white face, as
(Continued on next page)
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But racial prejudice and hatred are not the only causes. The riot was
like a circus or carnival." Both Negroes and the police would probably
not have done many of the things they did under normal circumstances.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the representative of the white man's law, who for nearly 800 years has en-
forced the laws-first of slavery and more recently of legally sanctioned segrega-
tion. C. SirBERMAN, CRiSIS IN BLACK AND WMTE 857 (1964).
Similarly, the bitterness that has been demonstrated by Negro rioters may
be the product of a long series of unforgettable personal experiences. Edwards,
Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 47
(1965-66). See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COn'N ON CrvI Disorinnus, REP. 159
(1968). Some conduct-breaking up of street gangs, indiscriminate stops and
searches-is frequently directed at youths, creating special tensions in the ghetto
where the average age is generally under 21. There have been complaints of
harassment by the police of interracial couples, dispersal of social street gatherings
and the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without objective basis. These to-
gether with contemptuous and degrading verbal abuse, have great impact in the
ghetto.
It is unfortunate that the Negro has this fear and distrust of the policeman
because he usually carries it with him wherever he goes, especially when he
comes North. He reacts with hostility at every action performed by the policeman
even though the action may be perfectly legitimate and this in turn causes the
policeman to react with hostility; thus we have a vicious circle evolved from
which only more harm can come. Cross, The Negro, Prejudice, and the Police, 55
J. Cma . L. C. & P. S. 405 (1964).
Feelings of hostility also exist on the other side of the conflict. Police
officers have grown up in a tradition in which part of their historic function
assigned by the community has been keeping the Negro in his place. This history
produces current attitudes which are illustrated by the number of police officers
who invariably use the hated term "nigger" in talking about and sometimes to
Negro citizens. Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex Role for the
Police, 64 MicH. L. Rv. 47 (1965-66).
These feelings of hostility are aggravated by the antics of ghetto youngsters.
They are not only hostile to police, but are eager to demonstrate their own
masculinity and courage. The police therefore, are often subject to taunts and
provocations, testing their self-control and, probably for some, reinforcing their
hostility to Negroes in general. Cross, The Negro, Prejudice, and the Police, 55
J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 405 (1964). The parents of these youths are mainly re-
sponsible for their attitudes. Parential antagonisms toward police influence child-
ren, thus developing unfavorable attitudes in early youth. These prejudices are
very hard to eradicate later, particularly if parents have used the police as a
threat to enforce discipline at home. The result of such attitudes in children is
the belief that the police are tough bullies who ignore civil rights and have
punishment, rather than protection as their primary aim in life. Falk, The Public's
Prejudice Against the Police, 50 A.B.A.J. 754 (1964).
8 Another point the looters made is that there was a frenzied, carnival
atmosphere about the looting. "When I got out in the street a strong feeling
overcame me," one said. "I can't describe it. It was like an urge to let yourself go.
It was a fever. I was hooked by the demon. It was like you caught a sneezing
virus and couldn't help sneezing. I couldn't help stealing. Everyone was stealing.'
The Courier-Journal & Times, June 16, 1968, § A, at 9, col. 3.
After the riot was underway, black youths laughed and pranced at the tips
of National Guard bayonets, mocking the men who were pointing them. But so
much seemed to have been done in a spirit more attendant to a college panty
raid. There was, at the least, the same kind of flouting of authority-the reckless
disregard for the consequences. The Courier-Journal & Times, June 16, 1968, § A,
at 1, col. 1.




Why did a fourteen-year old boy pay for the riot with his life? The
law in Kentucky still recognizes the right of a police officer to shoot
a felon attempting to flee, but not a misdemeanant. This felony-mis-
demeanor distinction is a carry-over from England.9 From the early
cases' ° to those of the present day, courts have relied on it in their
decisions as to the use of force in making an arrest. Yet if a police
officer may 'legally" shoot a fourteen-year old child in the back for
failing to halt, then perhaps this distinction has outlived its useful-
o McDonald, Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest, 9 CRan. L. Q.
435 (1966-67).
10 In a case where a riotous group resisted arrest by force, it was lawful for
the _police to shoot them if necessary to make the arrest. Lindle v. Common-
wealth, 111 Ky. 866, 64 S.W. 986 (1901). The distinction as to when an officer
may use his gun was plainly pronounced in Reed v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 126,
100 S.W. 856 (1907). An officer in attempting to arrest one guilty of a mis-
demeanor is not Justifled in killing the alleged offender merely to effect the
arrest, whether the offender be fleeing to avoid arrest or to escape from
custody; but in making an arrest for a felony, the officer may use such force as is
necessary to effect the arrest, even to the point of killing a felon when in flight.
The right to use force in making an arrest of a misdemeanant was greatly ex-
panded, with one important qualification in Commonwealth v. Marcum, 135 Ky.
1, 122 S.W. 215 (1909). There, the Court said that an officer may use such force
as is necessary or reasonably appears to the officer to be necessary in the
exercise of a sound judgment to overcome the resistance and to make the arrest,
but he may not, while the resistance is not forcible, wantonly shoot or injure the
person sought to be apprehended. (emphasis added.) Later, the Court said that
an officer having authority to make an arrest for a misdemeanor has no right,
except in exercise of self-defense, to kill the offender in effecting an arrest.
Hickey v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 570, 215 S.W. 431 (1919). This position
was reaffirmed where the defendant exercised no violence or force and made no
threat in the officer's presence and did not hinder or obstruct the officer, but
merely ran away from the officer. (emphasis added.) The officer had no right to
take the life of the defendant even though the defendant had committed a mis-
demeanor. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 159, 22 S.W.2d 599 (1929). A
year later, the Court, fearing that all misdemeanants would escape punishment by
forcibly fleeing, said that if one about to be arrested, forcibly resists, he is guilty
of a felony and the officer may use such force as is necessary to subdue him.
Bently v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 37, 26 S.W.2d 397 (1930). Later, the Court
said that where misdemeanants resist arrest by force or violence, the officer may
use such force as is necessary or appears necessary to overcome such forcible
resistance, even to the taking of life and the officer's right is not limited to the
single ground of self-defense. Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 573, 59 S.W.2d
540 (1933). The Court put a limitation on the Hatfield ruling in Siler v. Com-
monwealth, 280 Ky. 830, 134 S.W.2d 945 (1939) in ruling that an officer is never
justified in killing merely to arrest or prevent escape where the offense is a mis-
demeanor, or to inflict great bodily harm unless the latter is resisting to such an
extent that the officer is placed in danger of loss of life or great bodily harm.
This lir.:tation was reiterated in Scott v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 127, 190
S.W.2d 345 (1945), when the Court held that an officer in making an arrest for
a misdemeanor may not take the life of a misdemeanant who merely flees to avoid
arrest, but where the misdemeanant forcibly resists arrest, the officar has the right
of self-defense. The limitation was broadened in Rice v. Commonwealth, 288
S.W.2d. 635 (Ky. 1956), when the Court said an officer is never justified in
killing merely to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape after arrest when the
offense is a misdemeanor and in any event the officer must use no greater force
than is necessary or apparently so, for his protection. (Emphasis added.)
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ness." A riot situation is a unique situation, somewhere between the
extremities of misdemeanor and felony. The existing rules that apply
to the use of force in making an arrest should not be used to justify
the killing of rioters. There is even authority to the effect that felons
should not be shot.12 The clearest statement of the use of force as it
should apply to rioters was made in Kinder v. Commonwealth 3 when
the Court said that deadly force cannot be used to prevent a non-
dangerous felony and it is criminal to shoot at a thief even if the
larceny cannot be prevented by other means.
There are at least two additional reasons why deadly force is
inappropriate in suppressing civil disorders-the risk of killing innocent
persons and the catalytic effect of worsening the disorder.14 Deadly
force is not necessary to suppress a riot.15 It should be used by the
police on only two occasions-in self-defense'0 or to prevent the de-
li The felony-misdemeanor distinction is inherently incapable of separating
out those persons of such dangerousness that the perils arising from
the failure to accomplish immediate apprehension justify resort to ex-
treme force to accomplish it. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 3.07, Comment,
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1956).
12If an officer uses more force than is reasonably necessary to effect the
arrest and, as a result, kills the person whom he is attempting to arrest, he is
guilty of culpable homicide. Even in the case where one has committed the most
heinous felony there can be no excuse for a killing when capture can be rea-
sonably effected without sacrificing life. 26 Am. Jur. Homicide § 230 (1940). An
officer is not justified in shooting at and killing every offender who may fail to
obey his command to halt. Brown v. Weaver, 76 Miss 7, 23 So. 388 (1898). An
officer has no right to shoot a person who is merely running away from him
without committing any violence, where the latter is under arrest, or is trying to
avoid arrest .... 26 Am. Jur. Homicide § 283 (1940).
13263 Ky. 145, 92 S.W.2d 8 (19,6). See also N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 3520
35.25 (McKinney 1965). The preservation of life has such moral and ethical
value in our culture and society that the deliberate sacrifice of life merely for the
protection of property ought not to be sanctioned by the law. It is only when
the protection of a property interest also involves protection of the person that
deadly force may be used. No piece of property should be deemed to have a
value greater than the value of a human being. Tsimbinos, The Justified Use of
Deadly Force, 4 Cai. L. BULL. 3 (1968).
141nnocent persons-bystanders or passersby-may be killed by a shot fired
hundreds of feet away. The use of this excessive force or even the inappropriate
display of weapons may be inflamatory and lead to even worse disorders. NATIONAL
ADvISORY COMM'N ON CVn DisomEans, REP. 176 (1968).
15 "The fact of the riot itself is no generalized justification for extraordinary
police measures... " Note, Riot Control and the Fourth Amendment, 81 HAuv.
L. REv. 625, 628 (1968). Contra, The Courier-Journal, Sept. 25, 1968, § A, at 1,
cols. 2,3. Louisville's Chief of Police told the Kentucky Committee on Un-
American Activities (KUAC) that police should be immune from prosecution if
they are forced to kill anyone while attempting to put down a riot. This position
was strongly criticized in an editorial. The Courier-Journal, Sept. 26, 1968, § A, at
6, cols. 1, 2.
16 McDonald, Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest, 9 Cam. L. Q.
435 (1966-67). Force used in self-defense by a police officer must not be con-
fused with the use of force to restrain attempted flight. The former is justified by
the private necessity of preserving one's life and health, whereas justification for
the latter is a necessity in the public interest to effect immediate arrest.
[Vol. 57,
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struction of property that imperils human life.17 In every other
situation, measures to suppress the disorders without sacrificing human
life should be employed.
There is no one "perfect" method to suppress a disorder.18 What has
worked well in one situation may not work at all in another. This
means that our police departments need to acquaint themselves with
as many methods as possible and to especially take advantage of
technology. New technological developments make it possible to sup-
press riots without needlessly killing rioters or injuring innocent
persons.' 9
While there is no perfect way, the best way to handle a riot is to
prevent it from happening. 20 This could result from better communica-
tion between the police and the rioters. To get both parties to com-
municate, there must be deeper understanding on the part of both,
of the problems and personal attitudes of each. But, if a riot does
develop, the police must act intelligently, swiftly and with a sufficient
display of force to control it.2' The initial response of the policeman
'7 See generally Tsimbinos, The Justified Use of Deadly Force, 4 CMs. L.
BuLL. 8 (1968). Obviously, if a policeman sees a sniper or fire bomber in a
vindow of a building, he may immediately enter the building to search for both
the snipers or bombers and their weapons. Note, Riot Control and the Fourth
Amendment, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 625, 626 (1968).
isThere are no all-purpose control tactics. The cardinal requirement is to
have enough men and control equipment available to carry out effectively what-
ever tactics are necessary and appropriate according to the dictates of sound
judgment. NATIONAL ADvisoaY COMM.N ON CivIL DisonDEs, REP. 175-176
(1968).
19 Chemical agents such as mace, tear-gas, distinctive color and marking
dyes, sticky tapes, adhesive blobs, liquid foam, and a slick substance known as
"banana peel" could be used to stop rioters. Intensely bright lights and loud
distressing sounds capable of creating temporary disability may prove to be useful.
Cameras should replace guns; the filming of rioters has been recommended both
to deter and to positively identify persons guilty of illegal activity. NATIONAL
ADVISORY CONM'N ON CIvxi DisoRDEas, REP. 177 (1968). See also Police: The
Thin Blue Line, TniE, July 19, 1968, at 21. The only weapon the policeman
needs is a baton. As was demonstrated by the Chicago Police Department, during
the riots at the 1968 Democratic National Convention, a riot can be suppressed by
using only a baton. While some may feel that even the baton is too much force,
at least no one was killed in the suppression of that riot
20 Cross, The Negro, Prejudice, and the Police, 55 J. CaIm. L.C. & P.S. 405
(1964). The best way to handle any riot is to prevent it from occurring. This can
be accomplished by having open communications between the supporters of demon-
strations and the police.2 1 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CrviiL DIsoRDERs, REP. 267 (1968). If
an incident develops, and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessly and show acts of
violence the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force as to
make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and insure public
safety. See also Leary, The Role of the Police in Riotous Demonstrations, 40
NonE D mm LAw. 499, 502-503 (1965). When riotous activity breaks out, the
police have four basic objectives: (1) Prompt evaluation to determine whether
the initial incident is of riotous proportions or may escalate into a riot; (2) Rapid
mobilization and assembly of suffcient manpower and equipment to suppress the
riot; (3) Utilization of riot control techniques to contain the area of the riot,
(Continued on next page)
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has a crucial effect on the outcome of a riotous incident.22 The police-
man must be well disciplined,23 have confidence in himself,24 and use
good judgment 25 at all times. This could be accomplished by stressing
more detailed and comprehensive police training.
26
A riot occurred. A fourteen year old boy was shot in the back by
a policeman for failing to obey a command to halt. This unnecessary
killing has the blessing of the present law in Kentucky. This law is an
age old carryover from England incorporating the idea that property
is to be valued more highly than human life and the idea that all
felonies are more serious than misdemeanors. But, are these true to-
day, especially in a riot situation? A riot is different from the ordinary
felony. In the ghetto, it is a carnival, a festival, a gala event where
wildness, rampage, and "live for the moment" acts replace reasoning,
judgment and common sense.
Today is a day of change, and the day has come to change the
law in Kentucky. The felony-misdemeanor distinction should no longer
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
disperse the mob, and clear and secure the area of the riot and; (4) Establish-
ment of a security plan to provide sufficient patrol coverage of the riot area to
suppress the riot and maintain law and order. See generally J. Towman, TEE
POLICE ROLE IN RACIAL CONFLICTS 70 (1964). The basic requirements of a
police officer in case of a disorder are: (1) To prevent crimes and preserve order;
2) To enforce the law without favor; and (3) To protect life and prope.2 2 NATIoNAL ADvISORY COMe'N ON Crvm DisormERs, REP. 172 (1968). The
responding officers initial judgment is crucial.
23 Chicago, Illinois, Police Dept., Training Bulletin-Tension Situations, April
24, 1967. The police officer, by disciplining his emotions, recognizing the rights of
all citizens and conducting himself in the manner his office demands, can do much
to prevent a tension situation from erupting into a serious disturbance.2 4 NATIoNAL Anvisony Coam'N ON CnvIL DIsoRDERs REP. 174-175 (1968).
Officers at the scene of a ghetto disorder are likely to suffer vilification, and to be
the targets for rocks and bottles. Nevertheless, police discipline must be sufficiently
strong so that an individual officer is not provoked in unilateral action. He must
develop sufficient confidence in himself and his fellow officers to avoid panic or
the indiscriminate and inflamatory use of force that has sometimes occurred in
the heat of disorders.2 5 NATIONAL AiVIsonY COmi'N ON CrVlL Disopmnns, REP. 267 (1968).
The police should not over-respond, but should use good judgment and common
sense. See also Leary, The Role of the Police in Riotous Demonstrations, 40
NOTRE DA~vm LAw. 499, 504, 507 (1965). It must always be remembered that
rior to and during the riotous period, a wrong decision by the chief of the
tepartment, or by any of his subordinates down to and including each patrolman,
could worsen the conditions substantially not only for the immediate time, but
also cause conditions to persist for many days. The policeman's sworn duty is to
enforce the law. To perform this duty in accordance with the spirit of his oath,
the police officer must operate from a position of complete neutrality. His
actions must be impartial and objective.
26 Watchorn, Abuse of Police Powers: Reasons, Effect and Control, 24
FAc. L. REv. 48 (1966). Training must embody ideas ranging from simple
curtesy to social psychiatry, race relations, the status of minority groups, and
civil rights. Impartialty and the need for subordination of personal prejudices to
the overiding duties of law enforcement must be stressed. See also TIME, July 19,
1968, at 21. "A policeman these days has to be part psychiatrist, part social worker,
part karate expert .. "
[Vol. 57,
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apply in the unique riot situation. Deadly force should be permitted
only in self-defense or to to protect another human life. Not only is
reform needed in the law, but also in the attitude of our police. They
must understand the social and economic plight of the ghetto
residents. They should learn the most modem technological methods
of suppressing a riot-methods of suppression which do not resort to
the unnecessary taking of human life. Both reforms are needed, but
the statutory change is needed first-to be a proclamation declaring
human life to be more valuable than property and to be an impetus for
police reform.
John William Bland, Jr.
PHYSIClANS AND SURGEONS-RIGiiT TO P-AcrcE iN HOSPrrAL-PUBLIC-
PivATE HosprrAL DIsTNCrON.-Dr. Stephen Burkhart brought suit
against the Community Medical Center of Livingston County, Ken-
tucky demanding injunctive relief because the managers refused to
permit him to use the facilities of their hospital and refused to admit
his patients. The trial court sustained defendent's motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The trial court held that plaintiff had a right to practice in
the Community Medical Center only if it was a public hospital and
that a hospital is public only when it is supported by tax funds.
Plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. Without announcing any rule of
law applicable to the facts of the case (which the Court did not
have before it), the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that appellant
had pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. In the Court's own words, "appellant pleaded sufficient
facts to get a foot inside the door of the court." Burkhart v. Com-
munity Medical Center, 432 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1968).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has had only one other occasion
to rule on the right of a physician to practice medicine in, and to
have his patients admitted by a particular hospital.' Then, it followed
1 Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942).
A doctor was denied the right of operating in the hospital because as a general
practitioner he was performing operations usually reserved for specialists; to permit
him to so continue would have jeopardized the hospital's standing with the
American College of Surgeons whose indorsement was needed if the hospital was
to continue as an accredited hospital.
This case could have been decided without undue reliance on public/private
distinctions. A hospital, no matter whether it is designated public or private, has
the right to adopt reasonable regulations to insure an efficient, competent and well
run organization. A doctor who refuses to abide by these regulations forfeits his
right to practice in that hospital.
1969]
